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Abstract
Quantity surcharges occur when rms market a product in two sizes and oer a promotion
on the small size: the large size then costs more per unit than the small one. When quantity
surcharges occur the sales of the large size decrease only slightly despite the fact that the small
size is a cheaper option { a clear arbitrage opportunity. This behavior is consistent with the
notion of rationally inattentive consumers that has been developed in models of information
frictions. We discuss implications for consumer decision making, demand estimation, and
rm pricing.
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A standard assumption of empirical models of consumer choice is that consumers are fully
informed about all relevant products and their prices, and that they make the utility-maximizing
choice every time they decide on a purchase.1 Cognitive and behavioral research has produced
many examples { mainly through survey evidence { where consumers are not fully aware of
available products and their prices. More recently, a ourishing literature in macroeconomics
and nancial economics has developed the notion of rational inattention.2 The idea is that the
processing of price information is costly and that consumers need to decide the extent to which
they engage in that activity. This is related to the old notion of search costs (Stigler, 1961)
and is therefore not entirely new. The novelty is the emphasis on the explicit modeling of the
choice to process price information to re-optimize decisions.3 Models of information frictions
can rationalize behavior that would seem irrational in a world of perfectly informed consumers.
Terms like consumer inattention or limited attention have been used to describe the fact that
consumers may not be fully attentive to (freely available) prices because the cost of doing so
exceeds the expected benet.
Empirical evidence of consumer inattention, as dened above, is not easy to come by. Alter-
native explanations of non-standard behavior are dicult to rule out, even with highly detailed
data. In this paper we present evidence of consumer behavior that we believe can only be
reasonably explained by some notion of consumer inattention. We exploit the occurrence of
quantity surcharges in the pricing of detergent products in Dutch supermarkets. A quantity
surcharge is the opposite of a quantity discount; it occurs when the same physical product is
sold in two pa cks of dierent size and the large size has a lower price per unit than the small
size.4 Standard nonlinear pricing theory predicts that price per unit should be decreasing in
quantity sold, meaning that we should observe quantity discounts. Indeed, quantity discounts
are the norm in our data as they are in many other datasets. Crucially however, we also observe
many instances of quantity surcharges and these are typically associated with sales promotions.
Promotions in our data are usually for a specic size: when a product is available in two sizes,
either the small or the large size might be discounted in a given week, but not both. When the
small size is promoted, the result is almost always a quantity surcharge: the unit price of the
1There are a few exceptions, such as models of informative advertising (Sovinsky Goeree, 2008)), but the focus
is on dierent departures from the standard model than the one of this paper.
2Sims (1998, 2003) is credited with starting this literature. More recent work includes Reis (2006), Mackoviak
and Wiederholt (2009) and Mondria (forthcoming).
3An important dierence with the search literature is that price information can be freely available in models
of rational inattention.
4We borrow the term quantity surcharge from the marketing literature (Agrawal, Grimm, and Srinivasan, 1993;
Sprott, Manning, and Miyazaki, 2003).
1small size after the promotional discount drops well below the unit price of the large size.5
Quantity surcharges are extremely useful to the researcher because they give rise to an
arbitrage opportunity. Since the small size has the lowest unit price, all buyers of the large
size should switch to the small size, as long as they can approximate the desired quantity by
purchasing multiple small packs. Switching away from the large size does not happen in our
case study. In the raw data, sales of the large pack size during a quantity surcharge decrease by
only 14.4% in the median case relative to the week preceding the surcharge. Formal econometric
analysis yields the higher but still surprisingly low gure of 20.5%. We argue that the limited
substitution away from the large size in the face of a quantity surcharge is evidence of consumer
inattention. Since the small and large pack sizes contain the same physical product, a fully
informed consumer seeking to purchase a certain amount of product at the lowest possible cost
should never buy the large pack size if she can get the same amount of product by buying
multiple units of the small pack size.6 If consumers are attentive to promotions, we would
expect the sales of the large size to decrease by close to 100%. The 20.5% drop we nd seems
surprisingly small by comparison.7
Why do consumers select an option that is clearly dominated? It is dicult to come up
with a reasonable explanation why they would consciously choose to do so. Rather, it seems
that this behavior may be the result of consumers not checking prices systematically every time
they go to the store, which leads to them missing out on some good deals. Cognitive research
on decision-making in grocery purchases has demonstrated that the majority of consumers are
not aware of point-of-purchase prices (Monroe and Lee, 1999). Such behavior is not necessarily
irrational. A recent literature in macroeconomics and nancial economics revolves around the
idea that consumers can not possibly keep track of all available information and have to allocate
their attention to collecting and processing the information that would be most valuable to
them. In these models, not paying attention to all prices at all times is fully rational because
the costs of doing so outweigh the benets. This behavior has been labeled \rational inattention"
and it can arise through a variety of mechanisms. One notion that is relevant to our study is
that of \sticky information", where consumers only update their information (such as prices)
periodically, leading to information being \sticky" during the time between updates.
5Throughout the paper we use the terms \sales", \promotions" and \sales promotions" interchangeably to
refer to temporary price reductions, a common and well-documented pricing practice; see Pesendorfer (2002);
Hendel and Nevo (2006b); Berck, Brown, Perlo, and Villas-Boas (2008) and a large marketing literature.
6This is the case in our data. For 65% of the products the small pack is exactly half the size of the large one
and for the remaining products it is close to it.
7It may be argued that the two options (two small packs versus one large pack) are not perfect substitutes
even if the amount of product is the same. While this argument has merit, in section 3 we argue that it does not
suce to explain our data.
2In our context, we hypothesize that consumers are aware of the fact that many grocery
store items are promoted from time to time but the exact timing of promotions is dicult to
predict.8 A consumer needs to keep track of the prices of many products every week if she is
to fully exploit promotional discounts. This clearly has a cost in terms of time, and possibly
other costs as well (boredom comes to mind). We refer to all costs related to the collection
and processing of price information as monitoring costs. If consumers have dierent monitoring
costs, then some consumers will likely determine that the cost outweighs the savings from buying
at a discount and will choose not to check prices every week. On the other hand, consumers
with low monitoring costs will nd it benecial to check prices regularly and buy on promotion
whenever possible. We call the latter consumers attentive and the former ones inattentive. The
large responses to promotions together with the absence of arbitrage during promotions oer
support to this typology.
If consumers with low monitoring costs are also more price sensitive and if buyers of premium
brands are less price sensitive than buyers of value brands { both of which seem very plausible
{ then we would expect premium brand buyers to be less attentive than value brand buyers.
The empirical implication is that we should observe more substitution away from the large size
when a quantity surcharge occurs for a value brand than when it occurs for a premium brand.
This is exactly what our econometric analysis nds. When we estimate separately the response
to promotions of premium versus value brands we nd that all the action is in the latter. A
quantity surcharge for a value brand is associated with a 48% decline in the sales of the large
size. On the contrary, a quantity surcharge for a premium brand has no discernible impact on
the sales of the large size.
The idea that consumers choose to be inattentive to prices has some intuitive appeal but may
have undesirable implications if taken to extreme. If consumers never check prices, this would
lead to zero long-run demand elasticities, an implication that is dicult to accept. We use our
data to estimate simple demand functions that seek to measure consumer response to permanent
price changes, as opposed to temporary promotions. We nd that demand for premium brands
is less elastic than demand for value brands but is not perfectly inelastic. This indicates that
premium brand buyers do respond to permanent changes in the relative price of the two pack
sizes (as assumed by nonlinear pricing theory). The evidence is consistent with inattention being
a temporary phenomenon. Consumers do not decide to never check prices but rather to do so
periodically. This means that they will miss out on some temporary promotions, but when a
price changes permanently they will eventually notice and adjust their behavior accordingly. The
8This is the general consensus in the literature; see, for example, Swait and Erdem (2002). In section 2 we
present evidence to that eect from our own dataset.
3departure from the standard paradigm is noteworthy because the cost of acquiring information
is very small.
To our knowledge, our study oers the most direct evidence consistent with the rational
inattention hypothesis that a signicant fraction of consumers do not behave as if they were
perfectly informed. The only empirical works on limited attention that we are aware of are
behavioral studies of information opacity (see DellaVigna (2009) for a review).9 Two papers
have considered consumer goods as we do. They show that consumers respond less to opaque
information that is more dicult to process, such as nontransparent taxes (Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft, 2009) or shipping costs (Hossain and Morgan, 2006). In our application there is no
opaque component to the price that may confuse consumers. On the contrary, manufacturers
and retailers go to great lengths to draw consumers' attention to the promotional oers and the
fact that consumers still miss them seems striking.10
A possible interpretation of the behavior we document is that it represents a departure from
the rational paradigm and provides support to the literature on behavioral biases. Although we
can not rule out this interpretation, we think that the lack of arbitrage in our case study, and in
particular the dierence in substitution responses for premium and value brands and between
the short and long run, are better explained by models of rational inattention. The rational
inattention interpretation provides a bridge between the cognitive research on grocery decision
making, which shows that a signicant fraction of consumers is not aware about prices, and the
large literature on demand estimation that assumes that all consumers are aware of all prices
at each point in time. The key implication of inattention is that some consumers will respond
less to price changes than if they were fully informed; there will be less substitution than in
a full information world. A demand model that assumes only fully informed consumers will
attribute the limited degree of substitution to other factors that are included in the model, with
the possible implication, for example, of overestimating the impact of intangible variables such
as brand loyalty.
Our evidence comes from a single product and a single country. One might legitimately be
concerned about the extent to which our ndings generalize to other products in other countries.
On the other hand, laundry detergent is one of the most commonly studied consumer grocery
9Violation of rationality is also found when decision-making involves inter-temporal payos. DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006) show that some gym users could save by switching from a monthly subscription to pay-per-
visit. They rationalize this by questioning rational expectations and inter-temporal commitment and do not
consider consumer attention.
10This literature argues that, among other things, opacity depends negatively on salience. Salience increases
during promotions due to advertising and more visible price tags. This should increase substitution; not limit it.
Change in salience cannot explain our results.
4product in economics and marketing. It is an ideal product for studying the impact of promotions
because it has a near-constant usage rate and we do not have to worry about consumption eects.
The Netherlands has a developed retail sector with many similarities with the US one,11 and
our data comes from Nielsen, the source of many US datasets. Most of the patterns we observe
in our data (such as the frequency and depth of promotions and the magnitude of own demand
response to promotion) are similar to those found in other studies, and in particular studies of
laundry detergent using data from the United States.12 This is conrmed when we compare our
evidence on quantity surcharge with what is found using the widely used IRI Marketing Dataset.
There is no reason to believe that the phenomenon we document is specic to either the country
or the dataset. The magnitude of inattention, however, may be specic to our product. Rational
inattention depends, among other things, on the depth and frequency of promotions and on the
repeat purchase intensity, and these could change for other grocery products.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the market and
the dataset. Section 3 presents the ndings of our econometric analysis and addresses their
robustness and generality. Section 4 outlines a model of consumer behavior that is consistent
with our ndings and discusses its implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Industry, data, and quantity surcharge
Our analysis is based on data from the laundry detergents market in the Netherlands. The
dataset is similar in nature to the several other supermarket datasets that have been widely
explored in the literature. It was obtained from the Nielsen marketing company and covers
a period of 120 weeks between September 2002 to December 2004. We observe every size
of every brand sold in each of the country's four major chains, Albert Heijn, Super de Boer
(formerly Laurus), Schuitema and Superunie. For each size we observe the total quantity sold
and the sales-weighted average price. The detergent market is dominated by three multinationals
(Henkel, Procter & Gamble, Unilever) but private labels also have a signicant presence. Each
manufacturer markets several brands and each brand name is carried by several products.
A shortcoming of our data is that our information is at the level of the chain, not the
individual store. The reported sales are aggregated over all stores and the price is a weighted
average. A possible problem with this is that some items might not be available in all stores
11The chain we will focus on, Albert Heijn, is in fact owned by Ahold, a Dutch rm that is a major international
operator of supermarket chains owning, among others, the Stop & Shop chain in the US.
12Pesendorfer (2002); Hosken and Reien (2004); Hendel and Nevo (2006b); Berck, Brown, Perlo, and Villas-
Boas (2008).
5and thus will not be in the choice set of all consumers. Indeed, preliminary analysis of the data
suggests that this is likely to happen in the case of Superunie and probably also Schuitema.
In order to be conservative we will limit our analysis to the Albert Heijn chain for which the
data are most reliable.13 Albert Heijn is the market leader with 750 stores and a 27% market
share. The chain carries the major multinational detergent brands and its own private label.
Each product is typically oered in either one or two pack sizes (containing the same physical
product), respectively 45% and 54% of the times, and very rarely in three sizes or more. When
two sizes are oered, sales are roughly balanced between them. For the median case during
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Figure 1: Prices and quantities sold for packs of a selected product line
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the data variation we seek to leverage. The top graph plots
the temporal evolution of price per unit for each of the two pack sizes of a selected product.14
Promotions are easy to identify as large and temporary downward deviations from the regular
unit price. In each promotion the unit price drops sharply for a week, partially recovers in the
13We discuss this issue in greater detail in section 3.1.
14All prices in this study are measured per unit of product. Because there is no risk of confusion, we use
interchangeably the terms price per unit, unit price, or more simply price.
6following week and returns to its original level the week after that. Thus promotions last for
between one and two weeks. In the rst week all units are sold at the discounted price while
in the second week some units are sold at the discounted price and others at the regular price,
leading to a sales-weighted price lying somewhere between the two. The bottom graph plots the
volume of sales for each size (in logarithms). The impact of promotions is quite striking, with a
large spike in sales for the promoted pack. Sales increase by a factor of 5-10 relative to periods
with regular price.
Figure 1 indicates that although promotions happen fairly regularly it is dicult to predict
when they will happen next. The mean number of weeks between successive promotions of the
same product is 10.3, with a standard deviation of 10.5. When we limit the sample to products
that were promoted at least 10 times during the observed period, the mean drops to 6.5 and
the standard deviation to 5.2. Even with this sample of frequently promoted products, there
is large variation in the time between promotions. As a further test, we estimated a linear
probability model of the event of a promotion, using pack xed eects and a full set of dummy
variables identifying the time since the product's last promotion as explanatory variables. The
R2 from this regression was 0.0875, reecting the diculty of precisely predicting promotions.
A consumer who wants to buy on promotion has to check prices regularly.
During regular (non-promotion) periods, the price of the small pack is usually higher than the
price of the large pack. This corresponds to quantity discounting, a practice that in consistent
with standard nonlinear pricing theory. When the small pack is promoted, however, the price
order is reversed: the price is lower for the small pack. When this happens, we say that there
is a quantity surcharge. Quantity surcharge almost always happens when the small pack is
promoted and the price dierential between the small and large pack can be substantial (of the
order of 20-40%). There is no obvious explanation for why quantity surcharges take place. One
possibility is that the small pack is a more attractive choice for those rms who want to lure
consumers to experiment and eventually switch brands. Whatever the reason, we would expect
that consumers would exploit the promotion and buy two small sizes rather than one large one.
Figure 1 displays two other features we will leverage in the analysis. First, note that the large
pack size is also occasionally promoted and the price dierence between the large and small pack
increases substantially when this happens. Second, there are also some permanent changes in
the level of prices and in relative prices. In particular, the price series exhibit a structural break
around week 60. At that time (November 2003) the Albert Heijn chain initiated an aggressive
pricing strategy and sharply cut prices on a large number of products. As is clear from the
plot, laundry detergents were among those products. There are additional occasions of smaller
permanent price changes (all decreases) around weeks 20, 44, 73 and 112. The mean regular
7Table 1: Descriptive statistics on promotions
Total Promotions per item % time on prom. % prom. discount
proms Mean Median Max. Mean Median Mean Median
Firm 1 152 5.5 4 14 6.9 5.4 26.5 28.9
Firm 2 105 7.4 8 12 7.3 7.0 28.2 30.3
Firm 3 110 5.5 5 11 6.6 7.4 25.7 28.0
Firm 4 32 3.7 4 7 5.1 3.9 25.9 27.7
Overall 399 5.8 5 14 6.7 6.7 26.7 29.1
price was 13.4% lower in the last 50 weeks of the sample relative to the rst 50 weeks. The
gure is 16.6% when comparing the last 20 weeks to the rst 20 weeks.
We also note that the price dierential between the two packs changed as a result of the
price war, resulting in a lower quantity discount in the second sub-period. In section 3.2 we
will leverage these incidents of non-promotional price variation to compute demand substitution
across pack sizes in response to permanent price changes.
In order to proceed with our analysis we need to provide an operational denition of what
constitutes a promotion. In the spirit of the literature, we identify a promotion as a temporary
decrease in price of at least 10%.15 In practice this is implemented by looking at a six-week
window around any given price. If the price in the current period is at least 10% lower than
the modal price during the six-week window, then the current period is labeled as a promotion
period. Promotions lasting more than one week are counted as one event. The use of the six-
week window to dene promotions means that we cannot identify promotions in the rst and
last three weeks of the sample, leaving us with 114 weeks of data.
This procedure identies 399 promotions, the properties of which are summarized in Table
1. In the rest of this paper, we call the weeks without a promotion the regular periods for
that pack. Firm 1 does the most promotions (152), but it also has the most products. Firm 2
is actually the most frequent promoter in relative terms. Its products are on promotion 7.3%
of the time on average. Firm 4 (the private label) is the least frequent promoter. The depth
of promotional discounts is in the range 25-30% and is very similar across rms. These price
patterns are consistent with those reported elsewhere using detergent in other countries (United
States, UK) or other grocery products (Hosken and Reien, 2004, among others).
Out of the 399 promotions we identify, 197 involve single-item product lines. Of the 202
15Some authors use a 5% threshold. We prefer to be more conservative on what constitutes a promotion.
8Table 2: Quantity surcharge and promotions
Periods with Periods with All
no promotions promotions periods
Quantity discount 1,231 66 1,297
Quantity surcharge 90 110 200
Total 1,321 176 1,497
% of time with quantity discount 93.2% 37.5% 86.4%
Note: this table considers only products coming in two or more sizes.
instances when two sizes are available, the large size is promoted 76 times and the small size 126
times. On 26 occasions both sizes are promoted, meaning that we have 50 solo promotions of
the large size and 100 solo promotions of the small size. The frequency of quantity surcharges
is summarized in Table 2. The pricing schedule displays quantity discounts 93.2% of the time
during periods without promotions, which is broadly consistent with nonlinear pricing theory. In
promotion periods, this percentage drops to 37.5%. This is quite striking, and it demonstrates
that quantity surcharges occur frequently when a promotion takes place. Out of the 100 solo
promotions of the small size, 97 result in a quantity surcharge.
One may wonder whether quantity surcharges are specic to our data on a single product
from a single retailer. Marketing studies have found that \quantity surcharges occur in 16% to
34% of supermarket brands that are available in two or more package sizes" (Sprott, Manning,
and Miyazaki, 2003). As supplementary evidence, we turn to the comprehensive IRI Marketing
Dataset, which covers a large array of products in a large number of US retailers over several years
(Bronnenberg, Kruger, and Mela, 2009). We randomly selected ten stores from this dataset and
looked at the prices of detergent product lines in 2005. There were 7,670 instances of detergents
products available in more than one size and in 2,141 of those (27.9%) there was a quantity
surcharge rather than a quantity discount.16 The frequency of quantity surcharges in the US
data is even greater that what we observe in our Dutch data (13.6%).
The large discounts on oer during promotion periods suggest that there is substantial
incentive to substitute. When the small pack is promoted, for example, the median surcharge
for the large pack is 28.2%. In absolute terms, this corresponds to a median saving of e0.83
per kilogram. The savings exceed one euro per kilogram in 45% of promotion events. Quantity
surcharges occurring during non-promotion periods are substantially smaller, with a median of
5.0% or e0.21 per kilogram. Because quantity surcharges outside promotions are small and
16To avoid counting minor discrepancies, we used a 2% threshold to dene a quantity surcharge.
9infrequent, we do not consider them further and focus on demand response during promotion-
induced quantity surcharges only.
Promotions of the large size also provide opportunities for substantial savings. The price
of the large size decreases by 27.9% during the median promotion. In contrast, the median
quantity discount during non-promotion periods for the large pack is only 6.3%. Promotions of
the large pack increase the quantity discount to 28.3%.17 The savings obtained from buying the
large size increase substantially during promotions.
3 Econometric analysis
This section presents the results of our econometric analysis. We rst analyze demand responses
to promotional events, breaking down the response for premium versus value brands. We then
estimate demand response to permanent price changes and obtain long-run elasticities. Finally,
we address the robustness of the ndings and discuss their generality.
3.1 Substitution during promotions
We use regression analysis to study substitution patterns during promotion periods. We follow
a reduced-form approach that links the quantity sold of a particular pack to whether there is
currently a promotion of either the pack itself or other packs of the same product. Our basic
model is the following:
ln(qit) = i + bt + 1  BothPromLargeit + 2  BothPromSmallit
+ 3  OwnPromSoloit + 4  OwnPromLargeit + 5  OwnPromSmallit
+ 6  CompPromSmallerit + 7  CompPromLargerit + 8  AfterPromit + "it;
(1)
where qit denotes the quantity sold of pack i at time t. The right-hand side includes a set
of dummy variables designed to capture the impact of dierent promotional events. The
BothProm variables capture the impact of a promotion when both sizes are promoted at the
same time, allowing the impact to vary by pack size. The impact of a promotion of a single pack
size on its own sales is captured by the variables OwnProm and it is allowed to vary depending
on whether the item is the only one in the product line (OwnPromSolo) or whether there are
17The 28.3 gure may seem small and this is due to the fact that there is variability around the dierent
medians. If there were no variability around the medians, the quantity discount during promotion should increase
by 1-(1-.279)(1-.063) which gives the higher gure of 32.4%.
10two products, in which case we allow the impact to dier for the large size (OwnPromLarge)
and the small one (OwnPromSmall). The dummy variables BothProm and OwnProm are
exclusive and they describe all promotions: exactly one of these variables will be equal to one
for a given pack size in a week that it is being promoted.
The impact of a promotion of the competing size is captured by the CompProm variables
and is allowed to vary according to whether the size being promoted is larger or smaller. The
AfterProm variable is a dummy for periods immediately following a promotion and it is in-
cluded as a control variable for promotions lasting for more than a week.18 The specication
also includes a pack xed eect i that controls, among other things, for the selection rule
determining which products are promoted. If more popular products were more likely to be
promoted, for example, the omission of such controls would lead to overestimating the impact
of promotion on sales.19
Endogeneity of the promotion variables is typically a cause for concern in specications
similar to ours. This would be an issue, for example, if promotions were oered in response
to demand shocks. But it is hard to imagine why product-specic demand shocks would occur
every few weeks. Another possibility is that promotions are oered to boost sales of products
losing market share. Again, this is not borne out either in the sales data or in the observed
promotion patterns. The most plausible explanation for the timing of promotions and the choice
of item to be promoted may be that provided by Hosken and Reien (2007), who argue that
promotions are part of retailers' ongoing eorts to keep customer visits high and have little
to do with the particular product that is being promoted. Endogeneity of promotions is not
considered a problem in this literature (see, for example, the discussion on page 1645 in Hendel
and Nevo (2006a)).
A limitation of our data is that we do not have any information on advertising or other non-
price related marketing campaigns. This could aect our results in the following way. Suppose
a promotional discount on a particular pack is accompanied by an advertising campaign that
promotes the brand in general. The discounted pack will benet from both of those practices.
For non-discounted packs belonging to the promoted brand, there will be opposing eects: a
positive impact due to the advertising campaign and a negative impact as consumers switch to
the discounted pack. A specication that does not fully account for the campaign will attribute
the gain in sales of the non-discounted pack to the discount. The result will be that the impact
18As a robustness check we also estimated the model excluding all observations for which AfterProm = 1.
There was no dierence in the coecients of interest.
19We do not control for promotions of other products (as opposed to sizes) because we have found in other work
that their impact is small and does not aect the coecients of interest.
11Table 3: Impact of sales
Promotion of large when both promoted (1) 0.616 0.465 0.463
(0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
Promotion of small when both promoted (2) 2.604 2.165 2.185
(0.117) (0.116) (0.116)
Own promotion when no other size exists (3) 2.414 2.145 2.143
(0.044) (0.050) (0.050)
Own promotion of large size (4) 1.367 1.387 1.386
(0.088) (0.084) (0.084)
Own promotion of small size (5) 2.434 2.334 2.332
(0.062) (0.058) (0.058)
Promotion of smaller alternative (6) -0.114y -0.191
(0.061) (0.058)
Promotion of smaller alternative with QS -0.229
(0.059)
Promotion of larger alternative (7) -0.023 -0.042 -0.042
(0.084) (0.081) (0.081)
Brand-week xed eects No Yes Yes
Obs. 5,828 5,828 5,828
F-stat 647.4 16.97 16.99
Estimates from xed eect estimation at the individual item level. Estimates
of the constant term and the coecient on the AfterProm variable are not
reported. Signicance levels: y : 10%,  : 5%,  : 1%.
of the discount on competing products will be underestimated.20
We can partially control for this possibility by including brand-week xed eects bt. There
are 14 dierent brands and 220 packs in our sample. We get identication from the fact that
dierent packs of the same brand are promoted in dierent weeks. Thus we control for marketing
and advertising campaigns or other interventions that aect a specic brand in a particular
period. On the other hand, we can not control for product-specic marketing campaigns. Our
results are then valid to the extent that most advertising campaigns, or other actions that are
part of the marketing mix, are at the brand level rather than at the product level.21
Estimates from equation (1) with and without brand-week xed eects are reported in Table
3. We rst note that adding the xed eects causes the coecients on own promotion to fall
20Failing to account for advertising will also overestimate the impact of own promotion.
21This is consistent with the marketing literature on advertising, promotion, or display which is always con-
ducted at the brand level without distinguishing dierent products.
12(except 4 which increases slightly) and the coecients on a competing promotion to rise (in
absolute terms). This is consistent with the argument above and conrms that brand-week xed
eects are eective in soaking up promotional activity at the brand level. Our discussion of the
results will therefore focus on the coecients in the second and third columns. The dierence
between the latter two columns is in the denition of the variable CompPromSmaller and will
be made clear below.
The rst two variables listed in Table 3 capture the eect of promotions when both sizes are
promoted. They are included primarily as control variables but it is worth noting that, when
both sizes are simultaneously promoted, sales of the small size increase by much more than those
of the large size. The next three variables capture the impact of a single promotion on own sales
for solo, large and small packs respectively. A substantial impact is estimated in all three cases;
sales of promoted items multiply by factors of 4 (large size) to 10 (small size). We note that
again the impact is greater on the small size. These magnitudes are broadly consistent with
past studies of promotion (Pesendorfer, 2002; Hendel and Nevo, 2006b) and bode well both for
our data and for our empirical specication. The last two coecients test our main hypotheses.
The impact of a promotion of the small size on sales of the large size is estimated at -0.191,
corresponding to a 17.4% drop in sales. This is higher than the 14.4% that comes out of the
raw data but still surprising low.
In interpreting the -0.191 estimate, it should be borne in mind that promotions of the small
size do not always lead to a quantity surcharge. The correct interpretation of this coecient
is that it measures the response to a promotion of the small size. This should be smaller than
the response to a quantity surcharge if some promotions are so small that they do not generate
a quantity surcharge. The response to a quantity surcharge can be estimated by focusing on
promotions of the small size that lead to a quantity surcharge.22 Out of the 100 promotions of
the small size in our data, 97 lead to a quantity surcharge. We therefore re-estimated equation
(1), replacing CompPromSmaller with a new variable that ags instances when the small size
is promoted and a quantity surcharge results. The results are presented in the third column
of Table 3. At -0.229, the coecient on the new variable is higher than the -0.191 obtained
with CompPromSmaller, as expected. The dierence is not large, but we would not expect it
to be since the two variables only dier in three observations. The estimate corresponds to at
20.5% drop in sales for the large size in the event of a quantity surcharge, still very far from full
arbitrage.
The last coecient measures the drop in sales of a small size when its large counterpart
22We are grateful to Catherine Thomas for pointing this out.
13is promoted. The estimate is a very small and statistically insignicant -0.042. This seems
surprising given the substantial savings made possible by a promotion of the large size.
The ndings presented thus far make a strong case that some consumers do not take ad-
vantage of promotions and instead buy dominated options. We are able to identify this lack
of arbitrage by focusing on substitution during promotion between carefully selected pairs of
products. Previous studies of promotions did not identify this behavior because they aggregated
sales over products or focused on specic sizes. By examining the entire product line we are
able to identify patterns of behavior that are masked by aggregation or selective analysis.
While our emphasis is on the limited substitution across product sizes during quantity sur-
charges, we cannot ignore the fact that promoted products register large increases in sales.
This suggests that many consumers do take advantage of promotion opportunities. We next
examine whether propensity to switch during a promotion can be related to other consumer
characteristics, and in particular to price sensitivity.
Branded versus value products
Is the propensity to substitute during promotions correlated with other consumer charac-
teristics? In the absence of consumer level data, it is dicult to make denite progress on the
issue. We can, however, investigate whether consumer inattention depends on the type of prod-
uct. An important distinction in the context of groceries is between branded products and value
products (such as store brands). We can indirectly investigate whether inattention is related to
consumer characteristics because price sensitive consumers are more likely to buy value brands
rather than the premium brands sold by the big multinationals. This raises the question: are
buyers of value brands more likely to identify and exploit arbitrage opportunities than buyers
of premium brands?
Our data allow us to test this hypothesis. We split the brands in our sample into value
brands and premium brands on the basis of their prices. Value brands are the store brand plus
Henkel's Witte Reus and Unilever's Sunil. The latter two brands sell at a substantial discount
relative to other brands sold by the three multinationals. The results from estimating separate
responses to sales for each group are presented in Table 4.23 The impact of own promotion is
greater for premium brands across the board and the dierence is statistically signicant at the
3% level or better. A possible explanation is that promotions of premium brands are more likely
23We also estimated equation (1) with the pooled data, allowing the coecients of interest to dier according
to product type. The estimates were very similar to those obtained in the separate regressions. We prefer to
report estimates from the latter as they are more general, and use the pooled regression estimates to conduct the
equality tests reported below.
14Table 4: Impact of sales by product type
Premium brands Value brands
Own promotion when no other size exists 2.207 1.608
(0.054) (0.129)
Own promotion of large size 2.177 0.495
(0.110) (0.125)
Own promotion of small size 2.408 2.081
(0.067) (0.107)
Promotion of smaller alternative with QS -0.077 -0.655
(0.068) (0.110)




Obtained from estimating equation (1) separately for premium and value brands.
Item and brand-week xed eects are included. Only selected coecients are
reported. Signicance levels: y : 10%,  : 5%,  : 1%.
to induce switching from consumers who would otherwise buy a dierent product.
Our main interest is in the four coecient estimates on the two bottom lines. Comparing the
two coecients for the value brands with those for the premium brands, we note that the impact
of a promotion on the competing size is much greater for value brands than it is for premium
brands; the two coecients on the right column are several orders of magnitude greater than
those on the left column.24 Most importantly, a promotion of the small size of value brands
leads to a substantial 48% ( 1 expf 0:655g) decrease in the sales of large sizes. For premium
brands, however, there is no signicant change in sales. All the substitution taking place during
quantity surcharge is done by buyers of value brands.
3.2 Response to permanent price changes
Consumer inattention is by denition a short-run phenomenon. Consumers who do not check
prices every time they go to a store might miss out on some good deals that are oered for
short periods of time. An implication of inattention is that substitution across pack sizes should
increase as consumer become aware of price changes. For example, if a promotion lasts several
24The dierence is statistically signicant at the 1% level in the case of promotions of the small size but it is
not signicant in the case of the large size (see footnote 23).
15weeks one would expect that more and more of the consumers who buy premium brands would
gradually become aware of it and progressively change their purchasing behavior. This hypoth-
esis would be testable if promotions of varying lengths were observed in the data. Unfortunately
this is not the case, as the promotions in our sample typically run for just one week and rarely
for more than two.
We formulate an alternative hypothesis that can be tested using the data at our disposal.
If buyers of premium brands are not inattentive in the long-run, then we would expect to see
substitution between sizes when relative prices change permanently. The extent of substitution
that would be considered reasonable is of course hard to quantify, but certainly we would expect
to see some substitution for premium brands. We test our hypothesis by leveraging changes in
the overall level of prices during our two-year period { notably the price war that took place in
November 2003 { to estimate demand substitution responses to non-temporary changes in price.
We estimate simple reduced-form demand functions by regressing sales on own price and on
the price of the competing pack size (all in logarithms):
ln(qit) = i + bt + 1  ln(pit) + 2  ln(p0
it) + "it; (2)
where pit is own price of item i and p0
it is the price of the competing size.
There are two main dierences between this analysis and the one presented in the previous
section. We are now computing price elasticities, while Tables 3 and 4 presented demand re-
sponses to promotion events. In addition, the two types of demand response are estimated from
two dierent sources of price variation in the data: variations in price over time in the current
analysis and temporary price decrease of 10% or more in the promotion analysis.25 As before,
we include brand-week xed eects that control for many sources of price variation that could
be endogenous at the brand level (advertising, response to competitors, etc.).26 This greatly re-
duces the concern for endogeneity. We also note that much of our non-promotion price variation
comes the price war that brought prices down from week 55 to 75 (see Figure 1), and which was
an exogenous event.
In order to be able to interpret the coecients in equation (2) as responses to permanent
price changes (long-term demand elasticities) we remove all observations for which any size of
the product is promoted during the same week. This ensures that the price variation we leverage
25We note that this is a dierent issue from the distinction between short- and long-run elasticities that is
encountered in the demand literature. The latter deals with responses to a price change that are measured over
two dierent horizons; see Bentzen and Engsted (1993) for an example.
26In fact the addition of brand-week xed eects in this specication did not change estimates much. This is
consistent with our explanation of what these eects capture.
16Table 5: Estimates of simple demand functions
All data Non-promotion data
Premium Value Premium Value
Own price -4.038 -4.207 -1.603 -3.169
(0.504) (0.325) (0.644) (0.683)
Price of competing size 1.797 2.060 0.927 1.928
(0.498) (0.394) (0.447) (0.619)
Obs. 2,992 2,443
Item and brand-week xed eects are included. Robust standard errors are
reported. Signicance levels: y : 10%,  : 5%,  : 1%.
is non-temporary. In order to have a basis of comparison, we also estimate the same specication
with all data. In both cases, single-pack products are necessarily excluded from the sample as
there is no competing size.
The estimates are reported in Table 5. Looking rst at estimates obtained using all data,
we note that both own and cross price elasticities are quite high and they are not very dierent
between premium and value brands (even though dierences are statistically signicant). When
we remove promotion observations from the data, the picture is quite dierent. Estimated
elasticities are smaller and more in line with what is considered normal for this type of product.27
Demand for value brands is more elastic than demand for branded products. Both own and for
cross price elasticities are higher for value brands and the dierences are signicant at the 1%
level. This further demonstrates that the demand for value and branded products behave very
dierently in response to promotions and to permanent price changes.
The key nding in Table 5, however, is that the demand for premium brands does respond to
relative price changes over the long-run. We can therefore reject the hypothesis that the demand
for branded products does not depend on the price of other packs. For premium brands, this
holds for the sub-sample with non-promotion data only but also for the entire sample. One does
not nd that the substitution patterns across pack sizes violate demand theory when promotion
and non-promotion periods are aggregated.
One concern with the specication in (2) is that consumers may exploit promotions in order to
build their inventory and this will lead to reduced sales in subsequent periods. In a specication
that does not account for this possibility, this drop in sales (known in the literature as post-
27As estimated, for example, in the structural models of Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) and Hendel and Nevo
(2006a).
17promotion dip) may be attributed to other factors leading to biased estimates. The evidence in
the literature suggests that the post-promotion dip is actually quite small.28 Nonetheless, we
tried to account for this possibility by re-estimating equation (2) after removing observations
from weeks following a promotion. All four coecients of interest rise somewhat relative to those
presented in the second column of Table 4 but statistical signicance remains the same, even
though the number of observations is reduced to 2,072.29 We conclude that inventory eects do
not seriously aect our estimates.
3.3 Robustness
The estimated demand responses to temporary price reduction present somewhat of a puzzle.
If consumers are rational and fully informed, they should substitute to the small size during a
quantity surcharge. Why would they not do so? Could our ndings be a data artifact?
One possibility is that consumers cannot substitute because retailers run out of stock and
the promoted size is not always available. This would lead to lower substitution than under
unlimited supply. The possibility of stock-outs can not be completely ruled out, which is also
true of almost the entire literature on promotions. But we argue that stock-outs are unlikely to
be the explanation for at least three reasons. To start, stocking out does not explain why we
nd a substitution response for value brands but not for branded products; it would have to be
that premium brands stock out but value brands do not. Second, we conducted a phone survey
of store managers to clarify this issue as well as others. All managers we talked to said that
stock-outs were not common. Third, stock-outs are inconsistent with the fact that we do nd
a very large increase in sales of the promoted product, similar or larger to existing estimates in
the literature. As a further robustness check, we measured substitution using promotions that
last more than one week. Because sales for these promotions (121 of them) are positive the
in second week, stock-out is less likely to have happened in the rst week. The results do not
change when we restrict the analysis to (the rst week of) these promotions; we nd large own
promotion responses and no substitution responses. The combined evidence above suggests that
frequent stock-outs are unlikely to be causing the observed patterns.
A second explanation is that promoted products could be placed in dierent locations within
each store. They might still be available in each store but consumers may not be able to easily
28See Hendel and Nevo (2003) and references therein.
29The new estimates are (by row) -1.685, -3.298, 1.147 and 2.092. This method of removing inventory eects
has recently been proposed by Hendel and Nevo (2010). The results are also robust to decomposition by pack
size as in Table 4. The estimated coecients do not change but they become insignicant at conventional levels
for the small pack size.
18make unit pricing comparisons because the two packs of the same products are rarely located
nearby. We have also addressed this issue in our survey of store managers. All managers
responded that promoted items may be placed at the end of the aisle but they are usually left
in the regular location. Hence promoted items would be easily seen by consumers.30
Still another possibility is that consumers may have a strong preference for a particular
size. For example, two small packs may not be considered equivalent to a large pack that is
double the size because of environmental considerations (they use more packaging) or because
consumers are used to a certain feel or handling experience. There could also be storage space
considerations. Two small sizes may take more space that a large one, especially in the case of
liquid detergents. This distinction has a testable implication. If powder detergents are easier to
store because of their cuboid shape, then people would be more likely to switch to a dierent
size than with liquid detergents. We split our sample between liquid and powder detergents
and estimated separate demand responses for each type of product, but found no dierence. An
argument could also be made in the opposite direction: two small sizes provide more storage
exibility than one large one and may be preferred by at least some consumers. Overall, the
case for strong preferences for size seems weak.
The observed patterns could also arise if no one buys large packs of premium brands during
regular periods. The absence of substitution would occur for a trivial reason.31 We can easily
rule this out by looking at the raw data; large packs of premium brands do record sales in
regular periods. In fact, a larger fraction of large packs sales is recorded at the regular price
than is the case for small packs. For the median product in our sample, 17.1% of sales of the
large pack occur during promotions, compared to 50.5% of small packs. Splitting the sample
into premium and value brands, the corresponding gures are 22.1% and 58.8% for premium
brands and 11.0% and 43.4% for value brands.
The main cause for data-related concern is related to the fact that our data are aggregated
to the chain level. This could cause problems if prices, promotional activity or product lines are
not the same in all stores. There is solid evidence that this is denitely not an issue for prices
and promotional activity. Albert Heijn advertises the use of national pricing on its website and
all the store managers we surveyed conrmed that this is the case. We can therefore rule out
the possibility of prices and promotions varying across stores.
The possibility of dierences in product lines can not be dismissed as easily. The problem is
30Even if it is the case that the promoted items are located elsewhere, it is still a puzzle. Consumers who visit
the store often should know that this is the case and look for them.
31We thank Catherine Thomas and Aviv Nevo for pointing out this possibility.
19that some stores may not carry both pack sizes. Suppose that the small size is only available in
some stores but the large size is available in all stores. If the small size is promoted, consumers in
stores where it is not available have no opportunity to substitute to it (unless they go to another
store). In the extreme case where some stores carry one size and the remaining stores carry
the other size (and are located away from the former stores), there would be zero substitution
which would be entirely due to the lack of substitutes and not to consumer inattention. This
extreme scenario is highly unlikely, but the possibility that not all stores carry both sizes can
not be a priori ruled out. If many stores do not carry the small size, our main conclusion about
the lack of substitution to the small size could be questioned, though it would not be completely
invalidated at least for branded products: as long as both sizes appear in some stores, then we
should observe some substitution.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that non-availability of the small size is unlikely to be a
problem. The rst piece of evidence comes from the managers in our survey. Most respondents
reported that smaller stores typically carry the small size while larger stores carry both sizes (the
rest of the managers reported that they were not familiar with what other stores are carrying).
A second piece of evidence comes from the fact that we do nd substitution in the case of value
brands, suggesting that availability is not a big issue there. It is hard to imagine why the retailer
would oer more sizes for value brands than for premium brands, given that the latter make up
more than two thirds of the market.
For our nal evidence we utilize some additional information on product availability from
our dataset. Nielsen has provided us with two important pieces of data: (i) the fraction of stores
carrying each pack in a given week and (ii) the fraction of stores carrying any pack of a given
product line each week. In order to be explicit, suppose there are N stores. Let NS denote the
number of stores carrying the small size; NL denote the number of stores carrying the large size;
and NSL denote the number of stores carrying at least one of the two. The variables we have
are S  NS=N; L  NL=N; and SL  NSL=N. Clearly, S +L  SL. In addition, we also
have sales-weighted versions of these fractions.
With this information we are able to conrm what store managers told us about availability
of the dierent sizes: the median S and L are .89 and .52, meaning that the typical small and
large pack are available in 89% and 52% of stores respectively. When weighted by sales, the
corresponding gures are 92% and 61%. More importantly, by comparing S with SL we can
assess the likelihood of the problem scenario described above. That is, how often do stores carry
the large size but not the small size? Fortunately, the answer is not very often. The median ratio
S=SL is .97; the ratio is at least 85% for 90% of the products in our data. The median ratio
L=SL is .58, reecting the fact that large sizes are generally less available. This information is
20very important because it allows us to rule out the possibility that the lack of substitution from
the large to the small size is driven by availability. The fact that the small size is carried in the
large majority of stores carrying the large size is strong evidence that availability is not a major
concern. Availability might play a bigger role in explaining limited substitution from the small
to the large size since the latter is not available in a fairly large number of stores. This however
does not aect our main nding.
4 Discussion
4.1 Rational inattention and grocery shopping
Empirical models of grocery shopping assume that consumers are fully informed about point-
of-purchase prices. This is a simplication. Cognitive research has shown that the majority
of consumers cannot correctly quote the price of items they have just placed in their shopping
cart (Monroe and Lee, 1999). Dickson and Sawyer (1990) nd that \more than half of the
shoppers who purchased an item that was on special were unaware that the price was reduced."
In addition, consumers consider few alternatives for each item they purchase and spend little
time doing so (Hoyer, 1984). Lennard, Mitchell, and McGoldrick (2003) report that only half
of the consumers use unit pricing as an information source to nd the best option.32 The other
consumers nd that the information is too complicated to use or report that they do not have
the time to compare prices.
The cognitive evidence that many consumers do not systematically process point-of-purchase
price information challenges the standard assumptions of models on consumer decision making.
At the same time, there is ample evidence that actual consumer purchases are consistent with
the \law of demand" (that sales are inversely related to prices) and empirical demand models
that depend on rational choice assumptions produce reasonable estimates. As a result, the
mainstream literature has largely regarded the evidence on behavioral biases as interesting but
inconsequential and the two literatures remain separate. Our ndings present a more direct
challenge to full information models of rational choice because they question the outcome rather
than the underlying assumptions. Any standard demand model will predict that consumers will
exploit arbitrage opportunities when these are available and plainly obvious. By contrast, we
32Unit price comparison was possible in our application because information on unit pricing was posted together
with the product's price. The European Parliament and the European Council (1998) established directive
98/6/EC on consumer protection, compelling stores to display unit prices in an unambiguous, easily identiable,
and clearly legible way.
21nd that when the small pack is promoted, buyers of regular brand do not arbitrage and only
half of the buyers of value brands arbitrage.
The fact that consumers are not aware of all prices at all times has been recognized for a long
time. The marketing notion of \consideration set", that goes back to Howard and Sheth (1969),
argues that consumers only look at a selected subset of products. More recently, Piccione and
Spiegler (2009) have assumed that consumers follow procedural rules to decide what product to
purchase (e.g. rst choose a pack size and then select a product of that size). These models
are useful ways of operationalizing consumer behavior but they do not actually address the
issue of why consumers behave in that way. There are also other concerns that are specic to
our application. For example, consumers would have to sometimes change procedural rules to
accommodate the fact that substitution takes place in the long run.
Why is it that many consumers do not make simple unit price comparisons? After all, the
cost of visually scanning the supermarket aisle for possible promotions seems quite small and the
savings of close to e1 are not negligible. Dub e, Hitsch, and Rossi (forthcoming) have recently
introduced the concept of psychological switching cost to explain inertia in consumer choice.
Another explanation, recently developed in the literature on rational inattention, is based on the
concept of costly information. A literal interpretation would say that the consumer optimization
problem includes many products and it is costly to check all options at the store. As a result,
some consumers may decide (rationally) to not compare prices each time they visit a store. The
consumers who do not systematically compare prices may miss out on promotions. But they
rationally check prices at contingent \planning dates" and this explains why demand responds
to permanent price changes. Assuming that consumers vary in their monitoring costs could
explain the large responses to promotions and the dierence between branded and value brands.
It would also explain both the evidence from the cognitive research on price knowledge and the
diculty of nding nd violations of the law of demand (due to lack of arbitrage).
But one may argue that the time cost of checking prices is too low in our application to justify
inattention as optimal behavior. Consumers do not have to check many prices to take advantage
of promotion opportunities. For example, consumers could follow simple rules such as \buy the
cheapest per-unit pack of product X". Consumers who would adopt such rules would do better
than the consumers in our sample. This, however, is not the correct comparison. The potential
savings have to be adjusted by the probability that a suitable substitute is on promotion on the
particular day. An alternative way to think of this issue is to consider a consumer who prepares
a shopping list for a trip to the grocery store. The consumer knows that some items on her list
will be on promotion but she does not know which ones. She can either go through the retailer's
advertising leaet in order to identify the weekly promotions or she can look for them once she
22gets to the store. Either way, there is a cost involved with identifying promotions.
The point can be made somewhat more concrete. In our sample, a product is on promotion
6.7% of the time. The average savings from buying on promotion is around e1. If there is only
one alternative, the expected savings from checking whether the alternative is on promotion is
only 6.7 cents. To eliminate arbitrage, a consumer has to nd out whether a smaller pack exists,
locate it, make sure it is the same physical content, and then compare the unit prices. This may
take several seconds. Hoyer's (1984) study of consumer in-store decision making for laundry
detergents reports that the median consumer considered only 1.19 packages when making a
purchase and spent 4.77 seconds per brand. Taking this literally, suppose that it takes about
5 seconds to check a price. Engaging in a price comparison requires checking two prices, which
takes 10 seconds. A consumer with an opportunity cost of time greater than about e24 per
hour (=.067*3600/10) should not look for promotion before buying a non-promoted item. This
calculation accounts only for the time cost of checking prices. If some consumers get disutility
from engaging in price comparisons would only reinforce the conclusion. Costly information
seems like a reasonable explanation for the nding that some consumers do not arbitrage.
How many consumers are inattentive? Our data do not allow us to say anything denitive,
but we can make some progress toward getting an answer. We rst note that if attentive and
inattentive consumers consume similar quantities of detergent { which seems plausible { then
the fraction of inattentive consumers in the population will be equal to the fraction of purchases
made by inattentive people. This is a useful observation because the latter gure may be easier
to approximate. From the estimates in Table 3 we know that the sales of the large size drop
by 20.5% when there is a quantity surcharge. The implication is that 79.5% of purchases of the
large size during regular periods are made by consumers who do not check prices. If we assume
that each unit sold corresponds to one individual (which is consistent with evidence reported in
Hendel and Nevo (2006a)), this implies that 79.5% of consumers who usually buy large packs
during non-promotion periods are inattentive.33
A rough lower bound for the fraction of inattentive consumers in the entire population is
79.5% times the fraction of regular buyers of large sizes. This calculation yields an estimate of
27.0% of sales going to inattentive consumers, implying that the fraction of inattentive in the
population is also 27.0%.34 This probably underestimates the fraction of inattentive consumers
33The results reported in Table 4 give a similar gure. According to the estimates, only 7.4% of premium
brand buyers are attentive, versus 48.1% of value brand buyers. During regular periods, premium brands have
an aggregate market share of 58.3%. Taking this as an estimate of the number of premium brand buyers, the
implied proportion of inattentive in the population is 75.6%, not far from the 79.5% above.
34We compute the fraction of regular buyers of the large sizes as follows. The denominator is total sales during
the 120-week period. We obtain this by adding sales for each product during the entire period. For products that
23because it only considers inattention (a) among buyers of the large size (b) to promotional prices.
A deeper issue is that attention is probably not an all-or-nothing outcome. Consumers may be
attentive to some prices and not to others. Our results only speak to inattention to arbitrage
opportunities. The 27.0% gure is clearly a ballpark estimate but it suggests that the fraction
of inattentive consumers is not negligible and their presence should be taken into account when
constructing demand models.
4.2 Implications
Part of our evidence is inconsistent with most models of consumer decision making that have
been used to explain rm pricing (nonlinear pricing or promotion) and to estimate consumer
demand for grocery products. These models are based on assumptions that do not correctly
capture consumer responses to short and long term price changes. We briey discuss some
implications.
Demand models that are used in empirical studies of nonlinear pricing (Cohen, 2008; Thomas,
2009) or consumer inventory (Hendel and Nevo, 2006a) typically assume that consumers know
all prices, and most importantly, that they purchase the item with the lowest price. This is
inconsistent with the nding that a signicant fraction of consumers buy a dominated option.
Short-run consumer inattention may wrongly lead us to conclude that there are strong pref-
erences for specic pack sizes. Long-run demand responses show that this is not the case.
Inattentive consumers are also likely to overlook promotion of competing products. If so, de-
mand models that do not allow for consumer inattention may wrongly attribute the limited
extent of cross-brand substitution during promotions to brand loyalty.
The common nding in the promotion literature that short-run demand elasticities are
smaller than long-run ones has been attributed to inventory storage costs, commitment, ad-
justment frictions, or switching costs. Our evidence suggests that demand substitution may be
small in the short run for entirely dierent reasons. There is no adjustment friction or switching
cost in our application. The only friction that prevents consumers from switching is whether
they process price information.
It might be argued that the evidence on quantity surcharge during promotion periods is a
challenge to nonlinear pricing theory, which predicts quantity discounts and explains them as
are not available in all periods we apply the necessary correction to obtain a sales estimate for the entire period.
To obtain the numerator, we calculate the median sales of the large size during regular periods and multiply by
120 to obtain total sales of the large size to regular-period buyers throughout the sample period. Note that in
the calculation we only consider products that come in two sizes.
24a mechanism for exercising price discrimination (Stole, 2007; Maskin and Riley, 1984).35 But
this is not the case once one accounts for the fact that inattentive consumers do not respond
to promotion opportunities. The assumption at the heart of nonlinear pricing theory, that the
buyers of the large pack would substitute to the low pack in the event of quantity surcharge does
not hold for short term price decreases. Firms violate the concavity of their product lines for
short periods of time in a promotion, but there is little cost doing so.36 Everything else equal,
rms should promote less often products for which there is more substitution. Interestingly, value
brands, for which there is more substitution, are promoted less often than premium brands. The
median value product is on promotion 4.4% of the time while the median premium product is on
promotion 8.3% of the time, almost twice as often. This indicates that rms internalize the fact
that promotions can come at the cost of losing sales from competing packs - the cannibalization
eect.
5 Summary and conclusions
Consumers do not fully exploit arbitrage opportunities arising when a small pack size of a
detergent product is heavily discounted. Looking specically at value brands, we found that the
large size of a value brand loses roughly half its sales when its smaller counterpart is promoted.
This means that the other half of regular buyers of large size value products choose a dominated
option during promotions of the small size. With premium brands, we pick up no impact at
all on the sales of the large size in a similar situation. Essentially, all buyers of large size
premium products choose a dominated option during promotions of the small size. We also nd
no statistically signicant evidence of substitution away from the small size when the large size
is promoted.
These ndings come from estimating consumer responses to temporary price reductions. The
fact that we nd only partial substitution (or no substitution in the case of premium brands) is
somewhat surprising but not shocking. What would be shocking is if consumers did not respond
at all to permanent price changes. In order to examine this possibility we estimated simple
demand functions designed to give us estimates of long-run price elasticities. We found that
35Both the economic and marketing literatures have applied the theory of nonlinear pricing to consumer pack-
aged goods and most empirical studies use grocery data. McManus (2007) applies the theory of nonlinear pricing
to the market for coee drinks, Cohen (2008) to the paper towel market, and Allenby, Shively, Yang, and Garratt
(2004) to the beer market. In a review of nonlinear pricing for the Handbook of Pricing Research in Marketing,
Iyengar and Gupta (2009) quotes consumer package goods as one of the leading applications of nonlinear pricing.
36Another implication is that one should be careful in the conduct of empirical analysis of nonlinear pricing and
distinguish promotion and non-promotion periods. Our results suggest that the nonlinear price schedule should
be computed using long term substitution responses.
25both own-price and cross-price elasticities were quite reasonable and { importantly { non-zero,
even in the case of premium products. Consumers therefore do respond to permanent price
changes.
We propose an interpretation of these ndings based on the concept of costly information.
Keeping track of the prices of every product and its close substitutes on a weekly basis is a time-
consuming and, for many people, unpleasant task. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that
it is quite plausible that the cost of time associated with the process of collecting and processing
information might exceed the expected benet from it, at least for some consumers. These
consumers will choose to not be attentive to temporary price changes. Information complexity
does not have to be great to generate signicant deviations from the predictions of the standard
rational, full-information model.
This explanation helps reconcile the cognitive evidence that many consumers are not aware
about point-of-purchase prices with the wide body of evidence in support of empirical demand
models. Violations of the `no arbitrage condition' implied by these models can be found for
temporary price reductions but disappear with time aggregation. We argue that the lack of
substitution in response to promotion is not a mere curiosity. It is inconsistent with the con-
sumer behavior assumed in discrete choice models that have been used in the context of grocery
products to explain rm pricing practices (nonlinear pricing and sales) and to estimate consumer
demand. Our ndings point out some directions in which to generalize these models in order to
obtain better demand estimates.
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